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Abstract: 
Who  provides  the  European  Union  with  information?  This  paper  examines  patterns  of 
participation in the large expert group system under the European Commission. We explore 
competing propositions about the character of the Commission’s information system, and test 
four hypothesis about what affects participation in the EU expert group system. We separate 
between  three  kinds  of  information  providers:  scientists,  societal  actors  and  government 
officials. The empirical section of the paper builds upon an analysis of a data set covering all of 
Commission expert groups (N=1237). Although scientists, and interest groups, industries and 
NGOs are prevalent information providers for the Commission, we show that the informational 
foundation is strongly biased towards officials from national administrations. We argue that 
these  distinct  patterns  of  participation  increase  the  ability  of  the  Commission  to  anticipate 
reactions to its proposals and initiatives.  
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Who  provides  the  European  Union  with  information?  Information,  the 
communication  or  reception  of  knowledge  or  intelligence,  is  a  precondition  for 
governance  and  a  core  aspect  of  decision-making.  In  a  multi-level  inter-institutional 
system,  like  the  EU,  access  to  decision  making,  as  well  as  the  access  to  arenas  for 
supplying and receiving information, is closely related to the distribution of powers and 
influence. Both in the political and scholarly debate we find claims that the informational 
basis  in  the  EU  is  biased  towards  either  scientists  (Joerges  and  Neyer,  1997),  or 
industries and societal actors (Green Cowles, 1995; Mazey and Richardson, 2001), or 
national governments (Moravcsik, 1998; Pollack, 1997; Thomson, 2008).  
This  paper  examines  some  basic  propositions  regarding  the  informational 
foundation  of  European  Union  (EU)  decision  making  by  analyzing  the  access  of 
information providers to decision making in the European Commission (Commission).1 
The informational basis of Commission decision making is central to its autonomy and  
for  reducing uncertainty.  On the one hand, the Commission is dependent upon relevant 
and timely information in order to develop sound and effective political and legal 
initiatives in different policy areas, some of which are highly technical, posing high 
demands on the level of expert knowledge. On the other hand, information is important 
for identifying the range of possible and acceptable political initiatives and solutions in 
EU’s inter-institutional environment. Information on the preferences and positions of 
the  member  states,  societal  actors  as  well  as  academic  expertise,  is  important  for 
adjusting  and  calibrating  Commission  proposals.  Consultation  with  interest  groups, 
national  officials  and  independent  scientific  experts  may  enable  the  Commission  to 4 
 
assess the interests and constraints defended by these parties and to develop win-win 
solutions  (Scharpf,  2006).  Information  is  thus  critical  for  both  problem-solving  and 
conflict resolution.  
Research  shows  that  the  Commission  seeks  to  anticipate  future  reactions  in  the 
interinstitutional debacle. For instance, when political issues are salient, the Commission 
tends  to  promote  proposals  that  can  be  supported  as  a  compromise  between  the 
member  states and  the  European  parliament  (König,  2008;  Pollack,  1997).  Although 
there is a rich literature on the agenda-setting role of the Commission, and the likelihood 
for proposals to be accepted by the Council and the European Parliament, the literature 
has  paid  less  attention  to  the  mechanisms  and  processes  that  precede  formal  legal 
initiatives,  and  the  processes  that  increase  the  Commission’s  anticipating  capacity 
(Tsebelis and Yataganas, 2002). Our paper examines this crucial early stage in EU policy 
making by analyzing access to the Commission expert groups.  
Formally,  an  expert  group  is  a  consultative  entity  comprising  external  experts 
advising the Commission in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives 
as well as in its tasks of monitoring, coordinating and cooperating with the member 
states.  Over  time,  an  extensive  system  for  expert  consultation  and  involvement  has 
emerged in the EU. There were 1237 such committees in the beginning of 2007, making 
it the largest organized information system in the EU. The political significance of this 
system is also recognised by the other EU institutions. The European Parliament has 
actively pushed for information about Commission expert groups as a key issue of EU 
governance transparency. 2 The access to this system has thus become an object of inter-
institutional and public scrutiny.  5 
 
We examine the composition of the expert groups in order to identify patterns of  
participation  by  three  types  of  participants:  scientists,  societal    actors  and  national 
officials.3 The  analysis shows that   although scientists, and various interest groups, 
industries and NGOs play an important role in providing information in the EU, the 
informational foundation in the Commission is strongly biased towards officials from 
public administrations and in particul ar from the national ministries.  In addition, we 
observe considerable variation in patterns of participation in different policy areas.  We 
argue that this variation can in part be explained by the varying inter -institutional and 
environmental conditions that affect the Commission’s capacity for autonomous action 
and its task uncertainty. In particular we examine the importance of four factors - legal 
competence, policy age, in-house expertise and the density of interest groups - in a given 
policy area for the  configuration of expert groups 
The article proceeds as follows: First, we develop three competing ideas about access 
to  the  Commission;  we  do  so  with  reference  to  different  theoretical  conceptions  of 
European  governance  as  well  as  to  different  general  notions  about  the  role  of 
information and informational systems in decision-making. In section two, we give a 
brief  presentation  of  what  an  expert  group  is,  our  data  set,  and  discuss  some 
methodological issues. In section three, we provide an empirical analysis of the general 
pattern  of  participation  in  the  expert  groups.  We  map  out  and  analyze  the  various 
configurations of participants, that is, the combinations of different sets of actors that 
are  involved  in  the  expert  groups.  In  addition,  we  explain  why  participation  varies 
across different policy areas. In the concluding section, we outline some implications of 6 
 
these patterns for the understanding of governance in an inter-institutional system like 
the EU.  
 
What types of information providers for what kind of Commission? 
We separate between three types of information providers in EU policy making; one 
emphasising participation by scientific experts, one participation by societal interests, 
and  one  emphasising  national  governmental  involvement.  Each  of  these  three  types 
articulates  different  principles  of  organization  and  public  policy  making.  They  are 
grounded  in  different  basic  assumptions  about  what  bolsters  the  autonomy  and 
authority of bureaucracies as  agenda  setters and policy managers, and they provide 
different  answers  to  who  the  relevant  providers  of  information  are,  and  what  the 
underlying rationale is for structuring the informational basis of public decision making. 
All  of  these  actors  possess  resources,  responsibilities,  knowledge,  information  and 
experiences that EU policy makers rely upon. At the same time, these sets of actors 
might “hurt” the system, either as formal veto players or as social reference groups or 
key institutional environments that might impact on the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
decision making.  
 
Scientific expertise type: 
According  to  this  type  we  expect  that  expert  groups  are  composed  primarily  by 
scientific  experts.  The  underlying  rationality  of  this  view  is  that  a  bureaucracy  is 7 
 
organized to house and foster specialized expertise. The very term itself “expert group”, 
should indicate that these are groups composed by technocratic and scientific experts. 
The claim to autonomy and influence in a political system is intricately linked to its 
ability  to  present  itself  as  neutral,  grounding  its  acts  and  actions  on  updated  and 
specialized  information.  The  administration  is  seen  as  deriving  its  legitimacy  from 
principles of enlightened, knowledge-based government (Olsen, 2008b: 17). Being seen 
by other actors as incompetent, unprofessional and uninformed is then anathema. Yet, 
bureaucratic organisations have limited resources as repositories of knowledge and for 
gathering and processing new specialised information by themselves. Hence we would 
expect them to seek their informational partners in the institutions that embody the 
neutral professional-technical expertise more than any other, i.e. the scientific-academic 
community that represent the ultimate long-term specialization of knowledge. Expertise 
is  then  understood  as  scientific  information  produced  and  validated  through  the 
scientific method that ensures impartial information into the policy making process.  
Studies show that international organizations are particularly influential when they 
draw on independent expert sources to provide information that is scarce and valuable 
to the member states (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Martin and Simmons, 1998: 742). 
As part of governance beyond and between nation-states, international organizations 
often establish formal and informal channels for scientific input to the policy process 
(Andresen, 2000; Haas et al., 1977; Miller, 2007; Underdal, 2008; Keohane et al., 2009 ). 
Scientific expertise has the added attraction as source of information because it might 
transcend the  bias of information  imbued with national interests. The links  that the 
Commission as a bureaucracy can forge with outside expertise can lift it above “partisan 8 
 
and national squabbles” and accentuate its independence and authority derived from its 
technical-professional  competence.  The  role  of  science  is  central  to  the  idea  that 
epistemic  communities  shape  the  interests  and  ideas  pursued  through  international 
organisations (Haas, 1990: 11). It is also argued that EU policies are geared more and 
more  towards  exploiting  and  nurturing  scientific  knowledge  and  technical  expertise 
(Jasanoff, 2005), and that the increasing role of scientific arguments, especially under 
conditions  of  “technical”  uncertainty,  has  furthered  the  role  of  expertise  (Radaelli, 
1999).  
In  addition,  because  national  governments  are  represented  in  the  Council,  and 
societal interests might be seen as having formal and informal ties to representative 
channels, especially the European Parliament; we would expect the technical scientific 
expertise to be particularly strongly represented in the Commission’s expert groups. 
Drawing  on  scientists  as  the  main  information  providers  would  thus  underline  and 
legitimise  the  Commission’s  autonomous  basis  for  action,  independent  of  national, 
societal and partisan interests. We would therefore expect that scientific experts would 
be the main set of actors in the expert groups. 
 
The Society type 
According to this type, we expect that the expert groups are composed primarily by 
different societal actors and interests. A Society type posits a direct relationship between 
societal  actors  and  public  administration.  There  are  different  views  on  what  this 
relationship is founded on. One is based on the pluralist idea that societal interests and 9 
 
affected parties have a legitimate right to be heard and have their views incorporated 
into policy-making. Authority and legitimacy of a bureaucracy is derived from opening 
up  to,  channel  and  mediate  different  political  forces  coming  from  diverse  interest 
groups,  i.e. the  society  type  of  participation  reflects  deference  to  principles  of  input 
legitimacy. A second interpretation, is linked to resource dependency made famous by 
Rokkan’s  (1966)  identification  of  the  corporate  channel.  The  two  are  in  a  mutual 
relationship: administrators need information and support from such groups for making 
and defending their policies in their relationship with other political institutions; and 
such groups can use these organised links to further their interest and perspectives on 
policy issues (Peters, 1995: 181). Some countries, at the domestic level, have developed 
a web of consultative bodies ensuring the representation of affected parties in policy 
making (Christiansen and Rommetvedt, 1999; institutionalised in an elaborated system 
of committee rule. Such stable, routinized interaction and functional coalitions between 
organised  interests  and  highly  sectorized  administrative  system  is  one  of  the 
constitutive elements of a segmented state (Egeberg et al., 1978; Olsen, 1983: 115-118). 
In such a perspective, societal actors compete for access in order to give information to, 
make claims on, and put pressure upon governmental policy makers, and by doing so, 
they also provide links between citizens and governments (Olsen, 1983).  
This line of reasoning would lead us to expect that experts groups will be dominated 
by different societal actors. This resonates with the idea that the Commission is captured 
by for instance economic interests and corporate actors, and it also links to the research 
literature on the importance of big business in lobbying the EU (Andersen and Eliassen, 
1991; Coen, 1997; Eising, 2007). Interest groups in general have adjusted to the multi-10 
 
arena policy-making at the European level in a variety of sectors (Richardson, 2000), as 
new venues for interest  promotion have  opened up. The Commission’s rationale  for 
devising  its  information  system  according  to  a  Society  type  would  be  manifold.  The 
Commission’s civil servants would be interested in cultivating a relationship to business 
groups and organised interests as providers of factual information in complex policy 
areas  and  of  information  about  grass  root  preferences  (Broscheid  and  Coen,  2007; 
Mahoney, 2004 Bouwen, 2004). Constructing stable and manageable relationships with 
interest groups would also be important for a bureaucracy seeking to secure a stable 
environment  and to  enhance  its political effectiveness towards other EU  institutions 
(Mazey and Richardson, 2001).  
 
Government type 
According  to  the  Government  type  we  assume  that  officials  from  national 
administrations will be the main participants in the expert groups. There are two different 
theoretical underpinnings of the government type, one indicating member state capture 
of the Commission and one indicating administrative co-operation and integration. The 
first interpretation, consistent with intergovernmentalism, emphasises the interest and 
ability of national governments to influence, monitor and control the expert groups of 
the  Commission.  They  do  so  by  penetrating  the  expert  group  system  and  thereby 
increasing their role in EU agenda setting. 
In  the  alternative  interpretation,  the  Commission  is  seen  as  inviting  national 
governments into the decision making process in order to increase information as well 11 
 
as to promote administrative integration. Through these exchanges the Commission can 
get to know more about member states’ interests, events, perspectives and experiences 
than  any  single  member  state  can  know  about  one  another.  Moreover,  since  the 
Commission is dependent upon the member states administrations for implementing 
policies,  the  Commission  is  interested  in  developing  and  promoting  administrative 
infrastructures and networks that can serve to facilitate administrative interaction and 
integration  (Egeberg,  2006).  High  degree  of  involvement  of  national  officials  in  the 
expert  groups,  can  thus  been  seen  as  a  model  for  the  Commission  to  develop  a 
structured and organized connection  with national administrations and thereby also 
perforating national administrations. Interaction between national officials could also 
lead to the development of ownership to proposals, and it might even contribute to 
officials  “going  native”  (Beyers,  2005;  Checkel,  2003;  2005;  Egeberg,  1999;  Hooghe, 
2005; Lewis, 2005).  
These three types – scientific, society and government - can be seen as different ideal 
types of organizing access to decision making. In practice, we could also expect that 
groups  could  appear  as  different  kinds  of  combinations.    If  the  expert  groups  are 
composed  by  a  huge  variety  of  actors  from  different  levels  of  governance  and 
representatives from a combination of public, private and academic organizations and 
institutions, we might even consider it as a multi-level, multi-actor system, where the 
authority relies on creating an arena or meeting place reflecting the interests and ideas 
of multiple actors (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999). Finally, in such a multi-level system, 
participation  is  perhaps  also  seen  as  more  open  (Olsen,  2007:  124-125),  loosely 12 
 
organised  around  issue  networks  rather  than  around  closed  policy  segments  or 
established epistemic communities (Richardson, 2000).  
 
A composite Commission  
The Commission cannot be treated as a unitary actor. Specialisation according to 
sectoral and functional terms is a prime characteristic of the Commission (Curtin and 
Egeberg, 2008), Hence it can be perceived as  a multi-organisation (Cram, 1994) that 
operates in diverse ways. Role conceptions and behaviour for Commission official vary 
according to the features of the organisational structure within which decision -makers 
are  embedded  (Egeberg,  1999;  Egeberg,  2004).  It  also  faces  varying  environmental 
uncertainties and formal rules that affect the Commission’s basis for autonomous action. 
This  is  reflected  in  the    DGs    use  of  expert  groups.    Some  DGs  use  this  mode  of 
consultation  much  more  extensively  than  others  (Gornitzka  and  Sverdrup,  2008; 
Larsson, 2003). It is therefore important to examine how and to what extent variation in 
access of experts is dependent upon different features of the policy area at stake: under 
what  conditions  are  the  three  types  of  participation  patterns  most  prevalent?  We 
assume  that  the  different  DG  face  varying  types  of  uncertainties  or  are  faced  with 
different task environments, and that this  variation  leads  to  variation  in patterns of 
participations  in  their  expert  groups.    We  test  four  variables  in  order  to  explain 
participatory variation; each related to the three different types: 
Legal  competence:  In  the  treaties  the  member  states  have  delegated  legal 
competences and powers to the EU in different policy areas. In some areas the EU holds 13 
 
exclusive  competence,  in  others,  competencies  are  shared,  and  in  some  areas  the 
competences  of  the  EU  are  more  limited  and  primarily  related  to  supporting  and 
supplementing the national level. We expect that increased legal competence of the EU 
increases  Commission  autonomy  and  therefore  also  reduces  the  need  for  the 
Commission to consult national officials. H 1: ”The more exclusive legal competence of the 
EU in a policy field, the less likelihood for including national officials in the expert groups”. 
In order to test the hypothesis we attributed the competence distribution in the treaties 
to the various DGs responsible for these policy areas. 1= supporting/complementary, 2= 
coordinating, 3=shared, 4=exclusive.  
Policy age: Different policy fields have been subjected to European governance for a 
longer period of time than others. According to institutional theory we could expect that 
over time, disputes and uncertainties about the allocation of legal competence, norms 
and appropriate procedures is likely to decrease, hence allowing for more Commission 
discretion in older policy fields than in the new ones. In addition, over time, as a policy 
field  matures  the  Commission  is  likely  to  develop  institutions  and  experience  in 
handling issues in effective and legitimate ways, which in itself will reduce uncertainty.  
H 2 “The older the policy field is, the more autonomous the European Commission is, and 
hence the less likelihood for including national officials in the expert groups”. In order to 
test this hypothesis about policy age we use data on year for the creation of the portfolio, 
as measured by Broscheid and Coen (2003).  
Societal supply-side pressure: Social actors recognize expert groups as an important 
policy  venue,  for  instance,  business  associations  target  the  European  Commission 
working level most frequently in their efforts to influence EU decision making (Eising, 14 
 
2007; Kriesi et al., 2007). Yet, the various  DGs are subjected to different environments 
and pressure groups. In some policy areas the interest group activity is dense, while in 
other areas there is a much lower interest group density. H 3: ”The higher the density of 
interest groups in a policy area, the more likelihood that expert groups have societal actors 
as participants”. In order to test the hypothesis we use data on the CONNECS data base 
on interest group, indicating the number of civil society organizations operating at the 
EU level in relation to various DGs.  
Size  of  in-house  expertise:  Developing  policies  requires  scientific  and  technical 
expertise. Although the Commission holds considerable in-house expertise, its capacity 
is limited and it often also makes use of external expertise. Different DGs have different 
size of their in-house expertise and professional staff. In order to increase the scientific 
quality of the policy making process, different DGs might use expert groups as a way of 
outsourcing tasks, or increasing their own scientific knowledge base and we can expect 
this factor to especially affect the use of scientists to gather information through expert 
groups.  H 4: “DGs with a limited staff will tend to have a  higher share of their expert 
groups with external scientific experts” In order to test this hypothesis we use data on 
staff size per DG. 
 
Expert groups, data and methods 
Until now systematic data on the participants in the expert groups have been lacking. 
In order to study the patterns of participation in the expert groups we have created a 
data base of the Commission expert groups. Our data base provides information on key 15 
 
properties of these groups such as the lead services in the Commission, policy area and 
composition of the group. It classifies the participants in broad categories (scientists, 
academics,  practitioners,  industry,  NGOs)  but  it  does  not  contain  information  on 
individuals.  When  constructing  the  data  base  we  have  used  information  from  the 
Commission’s register of expert groups. Information was downloaded from the register, 
coded  and  entered  in  our  data  base  in  January  2007.4 Times  series  data  is  not  yet 
available.  The register is updated regularly and it only contains active groups, although 
data on meeting frequencies is lacking. Failure to report data on the expert groups will 
result  the  European  Paymaster’s  Office  denying  the  reimbursement  of  expenses 
connected to a group.  
We  define  the  variables  as  follows:  (i)  The  definition  of  scientific  expertise 
corresponds  to  the  two  types  of  actors  that  the  register  labels  “Scientists”  and 
“Academics”. (ii) Societal actors are here defined as a category comprised of several sub-
groups  of  actors;    “NGOs”,  “Industries”,  “Enterprises”,  “Social  partners”  (Unions  and 
Employer’s associations), “Practitioners” and “Consumers”. (iii) The government group 
of  actors  comprises  “National  administrations”,  “Competent  national  authorities” 
(authorities at national/federal level outside of national ministries, often referred to as 
national agencies), and “Regional and Local authorities”. In addition, (iv) we have coded 
the participation of experts recruited from “International organizations”.  
Before turning to the analysis, some reservations are in order. Firstly, there are of 
course  numerous  formal  and  informal  sources  of  information  in  any  politico-
administrative  system,  ranging  from  statistics,  scientific  journals,  media  reports, 
lobbying, parties and other EU institutions, as well as the more informal exchanges of 16 
 
information  and  gossip.  This  paper  makes  no  attempt  to  cover  the  full  spectre  of 
informational  sources,  but  focuses  instead  on  the  largest  and  most  organized 
information  system,  namely  the  expert  groups  in  the  Commission.  Secondly,  when 
examining patterns of participation and access, we should keep in mind that access does 
not necessarily equal influence. Our data does not allow us to examine the dynamics 
within  these  groups,  or  the  relative  influence  of  the  advice  provided  by  the  expert 
groups on policy making and implementation. Nor can we examine the role played by 
the  individual  members.  We  can  assume  that  there  is  a  link  between  institutional 
affiliation, and the type of expertise and information they represent, for instance, actors 
from scientific institutions are assumed to act as scientists, while actors from national 
ministries are assumed to act as governmental representatives. But, since roles might be 
blurred  and  since  participants  might  operate  with  mixed  allegiances,  for  instance 
bureaucrats acting as scientists, we should be cautious about making claims about the 
actual behavior of the groups or their impact on decision making. 
 
Who has access? 
Table 1 presents the distribution of participants in the expert groups according to 
the three types. The table shows that governmental actors are the principal actors in the 
expert groups, providing strong support for the Government type. Four out of five expert 
groups have participants from national administrative bodies. The most frequently used 
constellation  of  participation  in  the  expert  groups  is  the  one  where  national 
administrative officials only meet other national administrative actors. In fact, if you 
happen to open a door at any randomly selected expert group meeting, it is about fifty 17 
 
per cent chance that you will find only national officials seated around the table. Less 
than  20  per  cent  of  the  groups  have  no  participation  by  officials  from  the  national 
administrations.  
 
(TABLE 1 HERE) 
 
Table 1 also shows that expert groups composed only by societal actors, or only by 
scientists, are rarely found. Only 65 groups, or 5,2 per cent, are composed by scientists 
alone. Although few expert groups are exclusively composed by scientific experts, this 
does not imply that scientific expertise is unimportant in the expert group system. As we 
see in Table 1, scientists participate in one out of three expert groups, but they do so 
most often in combination with other actors, and primarily when societal actors are 
involved and to a lesser extent when national officials are involved. The relative absence 
of pure scientific groups, and the many mixed compositions, illustrates the thoroughly 
political and composite  nature  of EU  decision  making, and it can be  regarded as  an 
attempt by the Commission in some policy areas to build and organize a broad societal, 
governmental and scientific base for its policies.  
Similar to what we see regarding science, we also observe that societal actors are 
strongly involved in the expert group system. Societal actors are involved in 40 per cent 
of  all  the  expert  groups,  making  this  an  important  feature  of  the  EU  informational 
system. However, only 92, or 7 per cent, of the expert groups are composed only by 18 
 
societal actors, indicating that the Society type also gets limited support as a  “pure” 
model. Table 1 also shows that the mixed, multi-actor configuration is quite frequently 
present  in  the  expert  groups.  14  per  cent  of  all  expert  groups  are  multi-level 
conglomerates  where  representatives  from  national  officials,  scientist  and  societal 
actors come together in providing information to the Commission. For instance in  DG 
Education  and  Culture  this  mixed  mode  of  participation  is  the  dominant  way  of 
composing  expert  groups,  and  this  configuration  is  as  frequently  used  as  the  pure 
governmental type in DG Environment, DG External Relations and DG Development. 
When we unpack the three main categories of participants, another set of questions 
arises.  What  kind  of  configurations  of  participants  is  most  frequently  used  by  the 
Commission? Who is actually meeting with whom in the expert groups? Is it so that 
there are certain clusters of participants that are more frequently used than others? If 
so, what is the standard configuration of participation in the Commission expert groups? 
 
(TABLE 2) 
 
Table 2 lists the number of expert groups that each of the different types of actors 
participates in. There are several points to make. First, national officials from ministries 
are the principal group, and they are involved in seven out of ten of the expert groups. 
The  high  degree  of  access  of  officials  from  national  ministries  provides  additional 
support for the Government type. Second, we also find some support for the idea that 19 
 
expert  groups  are  part  of  policy  networks  that  penetrate  deep  into  the  national 
administrative  system  and  incorporate  national  agencies.  In  one  out  of  three  expert 
groups,  the  participants  come  from  national  agencies,  making  it  the  second  largest 
group.  This  observation  illustrates  the  multi-level  character  of  the  European  Union 
administration and shows that national agencies are also involved to a large extent in 
European governance, and that these agencies might serve different roles and principals 
(Egeberg, 2006).  
A third feature is that representatives from industries and enterprises form quite a 
large  group,  participating  in  around  30  per  cent  of  the  expert  groups.  There  has 
currently been considerable discussion in Europe regarding the role of industry and 
business  interests  in  influencing  EU  policy  making,  and  the  process  of  increasing 
transparency and regulations related to participation. Some has claimed that industrial 
interest capture large parts of the expert groups (AlterEU, 2008). Our data shows that 
the  involvement  of  business  interests  at  the  general  level  is  not  that  prevalent.  For 
instance, business participation is way below the level of governmental involvement and 
participation by scientists. Finally, we observe that representatives from international 
organizations  hardly  participate  in  the  Commission  expert  groups  at  all.  This  is 
somewhat surprising if we take into account that a high share of EU legislation is related 
to defining and implementing   international agreements.  
Although there is a magnitude of possible forms of configurations, these data clearly 
show that the expert group system is not a chaotic system, or a system with large and 
incomprehensible variation. In fact, it is a fairly simple system with some clear, stable 
and recurring patterns of participation, and it is easy to identify some distinct clusters of 20 
 
participants. The most frequently used configurations of expert groups are: National 
administrations only (26 per cent), National administrations and Competent national 
authorities (11 per cent), Competent national authorities only (6 per cent), Scientists 
only (5 per cent), NGOs, Social partners, Industry and Consumers (3 per cent), Industry 
(2 per cent), National administration, Competent national authorities and Industry (2 
per cent), National administrations and Regional and local governments (2 per cent), 
National administrations and Science (2 per cent) Science and Industry (1 per cent). In 
total, these top ten configurations of participant account for 61 per cent of all the expert 
groups.  
 
Factors affecting access  
Another striking feature in the data is that there is strong variation across policy 
areas when it comes to patterns of participation. In Figure 1 we map the ratio of expert 
groups that are only composed by national officials in the total number of expert groups 
per DG. This demonstrates the variations in the extent to which this type is the dominant 
one within different DGs expert group portfolio. Consequently, DGs with a low ratio of 
expert  groups  composed  purely  by  national  government  officials  use  a  different 
composition of information providers.  
(FIGURE 1 HERE) 
As we can se from Figure 1, in some DGs, (Eurostat , DG Taxation and DG Trade), 
almost all of the groups are composed purely by officials from the member states. This 21 
 
should not come as a surprise since most of the groups in these fields are related to 
functions  that  are  typically  conducted  by  national  governments,  such  as  developing 
statistics,  settling  taxation  and  customs  standards  and  rules,  as  well  as  engaging  in 
revisions  of  internal  and  external  trading  standards  and  regulations.  Although  these 
three DGs are on the extreme side, we see that the national governmental involvement is 
high in most DGs and in most policy fields. In fact, approximately half of the DGs have 
more than 50 per cent of their expert groups composed purely by national officials.  
Table 3 shows the result of the logistic regression analysis using a model with four 
independent  variables  that  tap  characteristics  of  the  policy  area  expert  groups  are 
linked to. We present the result of the model on three different dependent variables; 
participation by government officials, societal actors and scientific expertise. 
 
 (TABLE 3 HERE) 
 
We find that legal competence is significantly related to the pattern of participation. 
But,  as  concerns  the  expert  groups  composed  purely  by  national  officials  the 
relationship is inverse to what we expected in  H 1. National officials are even more 
frequently  included  in  areas  were  the  EU  holds  strong  legal  competence.  Somewhat 
surprisingly we find that in areas of exclusive competence, the Commission is more, not 
less, likely to use expert groups composed only of national officials. This indicates that 
national governments are the most vital parties for the Commission to consult even in 22 
 
such policy areas. We find that the DGs that do not correspond to the Government type 
represent very diverse types of policy areas with different level of legal competence. DG 
Research, DG Environment, DG Education and Culture and DG Agriculture, all have less 
than 25 of their expert groups composed only by national governmental officials (se 
Figure 2), and the top three users of expert groups (DG Research, DG Environment and 
DG Enterprise), each having more than 100 expert groups, all have less than 30 percent 
of their group composed purely by governmental actors. ur measure of legal competence 
is  crude  and  do  not  allow  us  to  tap  potential  significant  for  variation  in  legal 
competences within one policy area. Our results nonetheless indicate that the formal 
legal  basis  for  autonomous  action  given  to  the  Commission  does  not  increase  the 
informational autonomy of the Commission vis a vis the member states administration. 
Rather the opposite is the case.   
However, the data suggests that such autonomy can be gained over time: Table 3 also 
shows that the more established a policy area is, the less likely is that the Commission 
call upon national government officials for advice, indicating that Commission autonomy 
increases  across  time  as  a  policy  field  matures.  There  is  thus  support  for  the 
institutionalization  argument  suggested  by  H  2.  We  also  find  a  significant  negative 
relationship between DG staff size and participation by national officials. DGs with a 
limited staff tend to use groups composed purely by national officials to a larger extent. 
One possible reason for this relationship is that the use of expert groups can be seen as a 
way of outsourcing and increasing administrative resources. 
If we turn to the groups that have included societal actors as participants, we find, as 
expected, that this is positively related to the density of interest groups operating at the 23 
 
European level. H 3 is thus supported, indicating that composition of the expert groups 
is related to societal demand and pressure. The number of interest groups working in a 
policy  field  increases  the  likelihood  for  involvement  of  societal  actors  in  EU  policy 
making in the same field.  In addition, we observe that DGs with a larger staff tend to 
bring  in  societal  actors  at  a  higher  rate  than  DGs  with  a  smaller  staff.  There  is  no 
significant relationship between legal competence and the inclusion of societal actors. 
DG Agriculture is an example of a DG where the primary expertise structure fits the 
Society  type  (see  Figure  1).  About  one  third  of  the  groups  exclusively  composed  by 
societal  actors  groups  are  related  to  the  agricultural  segment.  Although  agriculture 
policy is a field of exclusive competence, with considerable financial and administrative 
resources at its disposal, this DG does not cater for its own expertise. Rather, these 
observations  suggest  that  participation  is  related  to  a  desire  for  consulting  affected 
parties, and EU policy making can be viewed as following a segmented pattern that has 
been  the  traditional  hallmark  of  agricultural  policy  making  in  many  West-European 
political systems (Steen, 1988).  
Under  what  conditions  are  scientists  the  most  prevalent  type  of  information 
providers?  Table 3 shows a positive relationship between the size of in-house expertise 
and the inclusion of experts. This is opposite of what we expected in hypothesis 4. It 
seems that increased size of the DG increases the likelihood for the inclusion of scientific 
experts.  We  also  find  a  negative  relationship  between  legal  competence  and  the 
involvement of scientific expertise in the committees. This fits well with the notion of 
the  Scientific  model,  indicating  that  lack  of  legal  authority  and  legitimacy  can  be 
substituted with scientific authority and legitimacy. Science groups are typically found in 24 
 
DG  Environment,  DG  Health  and  Consumers  (Sanco),  DG  Information  Society  and  to 
some extent in DG Employment. This corresponds to some other observations that are 
made in these policy areas. For instance, study of environmental international regimes 
finds a strong role of scientific expertise in this policy field (Underdal, 2008), and case 
studies of EU’s  food safety policy, which is  an important domain  for DG Health and 
Consumers, also underscores the prominence of scientific expertise in the policy process 
in this highly contested and risk-ridden policy area (Ugland and Veggeland, 2006). Since 
many groups with scientists are found in DG Research and DG Education and Culture, we 
might  even  suspect  that  scientists  are  sometimes  involved  more  as  affected  parties, 
rather than in the capacity as independent scientific experts. The table also points to a 
negative  relationship  between  interest  groups  density  and  the  inclusion  of  scientific 
expertise,  indicating  that  societal  pressure  tend  to  drive  out  the  involvement  of 
scientists. 
 
Conclusions 
Our  analysis  answers  the  call  for  returning  to  some  of  the  basic  questions  in 
European  governance,  that  is,  who  governs  and  who  has  access  to  decision  making 
(Olsen, 2008a). In this paper, we have showed that the Commission relies on a large 
expert group system for developing, monitoring and implementing European policies. 
The EU is often regarded as a multi-level system driven by incrementally adding bits and 
pieces to the functional responsibilities of the Community, resulting in a patch-work 
polity,  highly  segmented  and  complex  (Christiansen,  1997;  Kohler-Koch,  1997). 25 
 
However,  our  analysis  shows  that,  even  though  the  information  system  is  large, 
including participants from all levels of governance, private and public actors, scientific 
experts and businesses, there are some strikingly regular patterns of participation and 
composition  and  clear  elements  of  an  ordered  rule.  The  expert  group  information 
system  can  not  be  regarded  merely  as  a  technical  or  scientific  problem  solving 
instrument, but it must also be regarded as a system for resolving political conflicts and 
for building legitimacy for EU policy making. The term “expert group” signals both a 
mode for including a wide set of actors at an early stage around an agenda, a set of 
standards and some shared goals, however, it is also a mode of ordering, that is, both 
including and excluding, the access of participants.   
We  have  separated  between  three  types  of  information  providers,  scientific 
expertise,  societal  interests  and  national  governments.  Our  data  demonstrates  that 
officials  from the  national governments are  the  principal  actors in the  expert group 
system. Approximately half of the expert groups are composed only by officials from 
national administrations. In fact, the European level is to some extent inseparable from 
the national governments, making it part of a larger Union administration and a more 
integrated European administrative system. The expert group system acts as a channel 
and filter for national administrative information into the EU system, and vice versa. In 
short, there is a predominance of the Government type. It follows from these findings, 
that in order to  understand European  level developments  we  therefore  need to  pay 
more  attention  to  the  national  level  and  the  inter-linkage  between  national  and 
European governance. However, we have also shown that the DGs operate in different 26 
 
task environments, and that they differ in terms of scope and type of actors that they 
activate. 
We find modest empirical support for the other types of information providers. The 
assertion that the Commission is captured by businesses and economic interests is not 
supported by our findings. However, others have documented their dominance in other 
channels, such as lobbying and campaigning (Broscheid and Coen, 2007). The Scientific 
type  rarely  appears  as  a  “pure”  form,  as  one  could  observe  in  many  international 
organizations. Scientists and academics are frequently involved in the EU, but they are 
often brought in combination with other actors. The Society type also appears rarely as a 
“pure” form. Societal actors are frequently involved, but typically they are engaged in co-
operation with national officials or with scientists. We have also observed that when 
societal interests are involved, the composition of the groups are fairly heterogeneous, 
indicating that participation by some groups appear together with its significant other 
(Unions-  Industry,  Consumers-Enterprises).  The  Multi-actor  configuration,  including 
three sets of participants, is found in 14 per cent of the expert groups, indicating that the 
expert group system is a site for multi-level governance. These groups involve a wide 
range of public and private, governmental and non-governmental, civil society, scientific 
and economic interests. 
In addition, we have showed that there is considerable variation between different 
DGs in the number of expert groups they use and who they bring in as participants. 
There are several factors than can explain these patterns, and we have pointed to the 
need for legitimacy and the balanced involvement of societal actors, as well as the need 
for the Commission to have a sound scientific basis for its policies. The analysis showed 27 
 
that  the  degree  of  involvement  of  governmental  officials  is  related  to  the  legal 
competence held by the EU in the specific policy field. Areas of high legal competence 
tend  to  have  more  national  government  officials  involved  in  their  expert  groups.  In 
addition, we found that governmental involvement is reduced in more mature policy 
areas. The analysis also showed that increased density of interest organizations in a field 
increases the likelihood for participation by societal actors in the expert groups, and that 
the  size  of  the  staff  of  the  various  DGs  affects  the  likelihood  for  including  scientific 
experts.  
These findings have some implications for how we perceive  European governance. 
The  scale,  regularity  and  patterns  of  participation  in  the  expert  groups  represent  a 
significant element of EU governance, and it might contribute to create an informational 
advantage for the Commission, increasing the probability of successful policy initiatives. 
In addition, the high degree of governmental involvement in expert groups is likely to 
foster administrative integration and increase the degree of continuity in the EU policy 
making and thereby also contribute to reduce the level of inter-institutional conflicts 
and uncertainty. It follows from this, that the informational independence or autonomy 
of the Commission might be constrained by the biased composition of the expert group 
system, but these patterns of participation might nevertheless increase the likelihood for 
conflict resolution rather than escalation when it comes to drafting and implementing 
polices. 
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Table 1: Participants in Commission expert groups, by category. Percent. 
  Society   
   No  Yes   
   Scientists  Scientists   
   No  Yes  No  Yes  Total % (N) 
 
Government 
No  
 
0,2  5,2  7,4  5,9  18,7 (231) 
   Yes 
 
46,6  7,8  12,7  14,2  81,3 (1005) 
 Total      46,8  12,9  20,1  20,1  100 (1236) 
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Table 2: Participation in Commission expert groups according to type of actor.  
  Number of expert 
groups 
% of N (1237) 
National Administration   864  69,8 
Competent National Authority   422  34,1 
Academics/Scientists   412  33,3 
Industry/ Enterprise   352  28,5 
NGO   207  16,7 
Practitioners   157  12,7 
Social Partners/ Unions   146  11,8 
Regional and Local Administration   100  8,1 
Consumers   96  7,8 
International Organizations   27  2,2 
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Figure 1: Number of expert groups and share of groups composed by only national officials per 
DG 
 
Only DGs with more than five expert groups are included.  
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Table 3: Logistic regression model of access to Commission expert groups 
    Pure 
government 
    Society      Science   
  Beta  Standard error  Predicted probabilities  Beta  Standard error  Predicted probabilities  Beta  Standard error  Predicted probabilities 
Legal competence  .163*  ,075  1,176  -.092  ,075  ,912  -.284***  ,076  ,753 
Policy age  -.012*  ,005  ,988  -.001  ,005  ,781  .030***  ,005  1,030 
Staff (in house expertise)  -.003***  ,000  ,997  .002***  ,000  1,002  .003***  ,000  1,003 
Interest group density  -.007***  ,001  ,993  .010***  ,001  1,010  -.003**  ,001  ,997 
Constant  25,624**  10,026  1,3 E+011  .504  9,,747  1,656  -60.196***  9,733  ,000 
                   
N    1127      1127      1127   
                   
-2 log likelihood    1344,71      1397,90      1344,52   
Nagelkerke’s pseudo R
2    .210      ,162      ,142   
Note: Logistic regression. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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* Acknowledgement: to be added. The dataset will be made publically available for 
replication purposes.  
 
                                                           
1 For studies of Committees in the Council, see Beyers and Dierickx (1998),  Pollack (2003),  Fouilleux 
et al. (2005), and Häge (2007).  
2 According to ‘Framework Agreement on relations between the European parliament and the 
Commission’ (art 16) “The Commission shall inform Parliament of the list of its expert groups set up in 
order to assist the Commission in the exercise of its right of initiative. That list shall be updated on a 
regular basis and made public.”See full agreement here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/docs/framework_agreement_ep-
ec_en.pdf 
3 By the term bias, we do not imply that there is an underlying distribution that is fair or balanced, but 
we follow Schattschneider (1975) who argues that any group that is organized has some kind of political 
or ideational bias, because organization is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for action. 
4 It does not cover all expert groups and committees that are linked to the Commission. The following 
broad categories of entities are not included in our data base: 1) independent experts charged with 
assisting the Commission in the implementation of R&D framework programmes; 2) Sectoral and cross-
industry social dialogue committees, whose work is particularly aimed at the conclusion of agreements 
implemented by the Council. There were about 70 such committees in 2004; 3) Comitology committees 
(about 250 committees in 2004). 4) Joint entities arising from international agreements (170 joint entities 
in 2004). See: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/faq/faq.cfm?aide=2 